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Abstract
Defense mechanisms are a common reaction to social activism. With global protests such as the 
Occupy movement, and increasing urgency of climate change action, defense mechanisms in 
response to activism are a pertinent area for research. Three hundred sixty three participants viewed 
environmental, health, and ethical arguments in favour of reducing meat consumption, then 
completed measures of belief in the arguments, attitudes towards meat, and intentions to reduce 
meat consumption. All three arguments were effective at producing attitude and intention change, 
but the ethical argument was the most effective and most believable. Belief in the arguments was a 
major factor influencing the extent of attitude change. Decreasing belief in the arguments over time 
indicated participants reacted defensively in response to multiple arguments.
Digital Persuasion: Effects of web-based information and beliefs on meat consumption 
attitudes, and intentions
It was a sunny day in Christchurch, and one of my friends was marching with the Occupy 
Christchurch movement. A bystander angered by the protest yelled, “get a job,” to which my friend 
replied, “I have one.” The brilliant reply from the bystander was “no you don't!”(personal 
communication, 2011). Later a man walked into the Occupy camp and started smashing signs and 
threatening people with a stick. While waiting for the police to arrive a young female protester 
asked the (now calmer) man if they could talk about things “person to person.” The man replied, 
“you're not a person” (personal communication, 2011). In an online discussion about the benefits of 
washable feminine hygiene products (comfort, health, price, environment, etc.), one woman felt the 
need to write, “oh my god!!! this is so f-in nasty [sic]” (Ana, 2009). In response to an article asking 
women to turn off the shower while shaving their legs, one man wrote, “get over it you dumb 
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hippies. my reaction to a woman with hairy legs or armpits is 'gross' [sic]” (personal 
communication, 2011). Such reactions are common; many of us have seen bumper stickers that read 
“save a cow, eat a vegetarian.” We may have even reacted in similar ways ourselves, be honest, did 
the thought of reusable feminine hygiene products make you a little uncomfortable? Though there is 
much research on defense mechanisms (e.g. Baumeister, Dale & Sommer, 1998; Cramer, 2000; Hart 
& Chmiel, 1992; de Hoog, Stroebe & de Wit, 2005; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992; Matsuba & 
Walker, 1998) there is very little research on defense mechanisms in the face of activism. Yet as 
protests increasingly go global it is an area of considerable value. 
Why would people react to activism with defense mechanisms? Activists (intentionally or 
otherwise) often imply that our actions are immoral in some way, or that the status quo is likely to 
result in some sort of impending doom. Environmental activists, for example, carry the implication 
that not only is climate change real, but extremely serious. Climate change has some rather anxiety-
provoking consequences: frequent severe storms, complete inundation of some of the small Pacific 
island nations, and a rate of species extinction that is currently higher than it has been since the end 
of the Cretaceous Period (when the dinosaurs became extinct). If defense mechanisms protect 
against anxiety or discomfort (DuNann Winter & Koger, 2010; Funder, 2004), then it is hardly 
surprising that activists should provoke defense mechanisms. On the other hand, most people think 
of themselves as good people, and good people do not trash the planet or cause mass species 
extinctions, yet we are undeniably each part of the cause of climate change. If defense mechanisms 
are meant to preserve self esteem (Baumeister, Dale & Sommer, 1998), then when confronted by 
activists whose ideologies threaten one's self concept, defense mechanisms are likely to result.
Though the examples above are clearly defensive, the majority of potentially defensive reactions are 
much subtler. Denial appears to be the most common reaction to activism. On an individual level, 
scepticism or disagreement with a statement can appear quite similar to denial or rationalization. 
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For example, a person might argue that she does not use fluorescent light bulbs because they take a 
little time to reach their full brightness, but unless she needs to run at full tilt across a room the 
instant the light turns on, she is likely being defensive. However, if she argues that she does not use 
them because they give her migraines, or because their high mercury content is damaging in areas 
without proper disposal facilities, this is not a defensive reaction. A useful distinction is that sceptics 
examine the evidence carefully and follow where it leads, changing their attitudes accordingly, 
whereas deniers simply deny the validity of the argument indefinitely (Shermer, 2010). DuNann 
Winter and Koger also make a useful observation: “When denial is used as a defense, there is a 
subtext of frustration or hostility” (2010, p. 76). Thus even on an individual level we can sometimes 
tell the difference between denial and scepticism.
Defense mechanisms are easier to detect on a population level. If reactions to activism show 
distinctive patterns across a sample, such decreasing in agreement with an issue over time, or 
decelerating attitude change, that are not attributable to another cause, this would indicate 
defensiveness. Though mild and short-lived defense mechanisms are an adaptive response to 
anxiety-provoking information, if the defenses negatively affect quality of life or have the potential 
to affect it in future, and do not resolve within a reasonable amount of time, then the defenses 
should be considered maladaptive. Therefore, given that climate change is likely to have a 
considerable impact on our quality of life in the future (and in some areas already has), continued 
denial of the existence of anthropogenic climate change is maladaptive and should be treated. This 
may seem an extreme statement given the popular misinformation about climate change, however 
the science behind the theory of the greenhouse effect is quite clear, and there are many easy to 
understand, reliable resources available on the internet.
Recent research in Environmental psychology and related fields is creating a wealth of information 
on conducting successful attitude and behaviour change campaigns. Unfortunately, this information 
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rarely disseminates as far as practitioners and activists. A handful of books have been written for 
practitioners on techniques to promote behaviour change in a target population (e.g. McKenzie-
Mohr & Smith, 1999; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009), and several enterprising people have created 
businesses to teach people psychological technique to promote environmental behaviour (Cotter, 
2012; McKenzie-Mohr, 2010; Natural Step, 2012). Unfortunately though, despite repeated 
recommendations to avoid the use of information-only campaigns, they continue to dominate the 
field of pro-environment behaviour change. Information-only campaigns may persist in the face of 
evidence against their effectiveness due to the ease and low cost of running them, and the intuitive 
reasoning that if you explain to a person why he should not do X, then he is less likely to do X. The 
intuitive appeal of information campaigns is evident when psychologists assume that merely 
informing practitioners of the ineffectiveness of information-only campaigns will be sufficient to 
cause the practitioners to change their behaviour. The continued prevalence of information-only 
campaigns suggests that rather than continuing to insist that they are less effective, psychologists 
should investigate ways to make them more effective. Websites are a popular tool for activists and 
government officials, so it is useful to investigate whether an information-only paradigm is effective 
via the web. 
For decades Environmental psychologists have designed and implemented interventions to increase 
sustainable behaviours. In an effort to choose behaviours that are easy to change, psychologists 
have tended to focus on low-impact environmental behaviours (cf. McKenzie-Mohr & Smith, 1999; 
Steg & Vlek, 2009), such as installing compact fluorescent light bulbs, reusing shopping bags, and 
raising the blades on lawn mowers. While it is worthwhile intervening in low-impact behaviours, 
the environmental benefits of the field would increase dramatically if higher-impact behaviours 
were chosen. There is a belief that high-impact behaviours are hard to change, and low-impact ones 
easy (c.f. McKenzie-Mohr & Smith, 1999), but this is a false dichotomy. It can be equally hard to 
convince people to engage in low-impact behaviours (refraining from using modern personal 
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hygiene products) and high-impact behaviours (using sustainable modes of transport). Some high 
impact behaviours, however, (washing clothes in cold water, limiting your reproduction) are 
relatively easy to implement in developed nations. If psychologists make the effort to find easy-to-
change higher-impact behaviours, then the field could make an appreciable improvement for our 
environment.
Meat consumption has one of the highest environmental impacts of any behaviour (Steinfeld et al., 
2006). Meat production creates 18% of global greenhouse gas emissions (more than  transport), and 
is a primary contributor to water pollution (Hall, Leavitt, Quinlan, Dixit & Smol, 1999; Unwin, 
Snelder, Booker, Ballantine & Lessard, 2010; Steinfeld et al., 2006; Verburg, Hamill, Unwin & 
Abell, 2010). Though improved management of this sector can greatly reduce its impacts (Steinfeld 
et al., 2006), by far the most effective and immediate reductions can be achieved simply by 
consuming less meat. If every omnivore in developed nations ate one more vegetarian or vegan 
meal each week, emissions and other impacts of meat production could be reduced by nearly 15%. 
Conversely, reducing meat consumption has relatively few barriers. Barriers are obstructions to the 
target behaviour, such as lack of time or ability to perform the behaviour, and should be investigated 
before undertaking any behaviour change program (McKenzie-Mohr & Smith, 1999). Informing a 
campaign with a barrier analysis decreases the likelihood that common barriers will prevent 
participants from achieving the desired behaviour change. The barriers to reducing meat 
consumption include lack of familiarity with vegetarian protein sources (Hoek, Luning, Weijzen, 
Engels, 2011; Lea & Worsley, 2008), but these should be relatively minor, as people are more 
inclined to eat novel plant-based foods than novel meats (Pliner & Pelchat, 1991). This suggests 
that any attempt to reduce meat consumption should include advice on preparing low-
meat/vegetarian meals with recognisably plant-based protein sources such as beans. Another 
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potential barrier is the dietary preferences of others in the household (Hoek et al., 2011; Larsson et 
al., 2003). In a very small sample of vegans, Larsson et al. (2003) found that young people were 
more inclined to become vegetarians once they left home and had greater control over their food 
choices. Household preference barriers could be reduced by including smaller amounts of meat in 
several meals (rather than no meat in one meal), and should be less of a problem for people looking 
to reduce their meat consumption (as in this experiment) than for people trying to become 
vegetarian. The research did not turn up many barriers to reducing meat consumption, and those 
present should be manageable by instructing participants in how to avoid them. This makes meat 
consumption a good candidate for an information campaign.
The literature contains two theories which could give an appropriate framework for this experiment: 
Value-Belief-Norm Theory (VBN; Stern, 2000), and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; Ajzen 
2002; 2005). Though it is widely used in the literature, VBN Theory relies on moral and altruistic 
values to explain pro-environmental behaviour, and does not account for people engaging in pro-
environmental behaviours for more individualistic reasons, such as health. The TPB accounts for 
many motivations within the attitude heading, including affective (Ajzen, 2005) and moral 
considerations (Kaiser & Scheuthle, 2003). Intentions in the TPB have been recently found to 
account for 95% of conservation behaviour, and personal norms in VBN theory only 64% (Kaiser, 
Hübner, & Bogner, 2005). I will therefore use the TPB as the theoretical framework for this 
experiment.
The TPB posits that behaviour is determined by intention to perform the behaviour and control over 
the behaviour (Ajzen, 2006; Ajzen & Albarracín, 2010). Intentions in turn are influenced by the 
combination of attitude towards the behaviour, social norms concerning the behaviour, and 
perceptions about the amount of control a person has over the behaviour (perceived behaviour 
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control; Ajzen 2002; 2005; 2006; Ajzen & Albarracín, 2010). Therefore the TPB presents three 
targets when designing a behavioural intervention; attitudes, social norms, and perceived behaviour 
control (PBC). PBC is essentially the inverse of barriers to behaviour.
Providing people with information about a problem should largely affect attitudes unless the 
information is specifically targeted at making social norms salient or increasing PBC. This is a 
likely cause of the failure of many informational interventions to produce meaningful behaviour 
change because only one aspect (attitudes, not social norms or perceived behaviour control) of 
behaviour change has been addressed. If a particular behaviour is best predicted by social norms or 
PBC, influencing attitudes will have little effect on behaviour. McCarthy, O'Reilly, Cotter and de 
Boer (2004) noted that attitudes were a better predictor of meat consumption than subjective norm, 
therefore attitudes are an appropriate focus for an intervention in this case. PBC will be targeted as 
well by addressing the barriers outlined above.
Information about the health risks or moral concerns of meat consumption has previously been 
effective at changing attitudes (Berndsen & Van der Pligt, 2005). In discussions about food choices, 
outspoken vegetarians and vegans will often present multiple arguments for a vegetarian/vegan diet 
in quick succession, however anecdotal evidence suggests this often makes the targets defensive, 
and may cause them to avoid vegetarians or deny the validity of their arguments. Conversely, 
Berndsen and Van der Pligt (2005) found that attitudes towards meat consumption became less pro-
meat over time when participants had the opportunity to reflect upon them. Further anecdotal 
evidence also suggests that gentle persuasion, modelling, and social norms over the course of 
several years are likely to transform a meat-eater into a meat-avoider, and may even be potent 
enough to induce the target to do a masters thesis on reductions in meat consumption. I hypothesize 
therefore that arguments against meat consumption will initially change attitudes and intentions to 
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consume meat, but will also induce a saturation effect whereby after a point additional arguments 
will cease to change attitudes, and in some cases may even start to reverse attitudes.
Three arguments for reducing meat consumption are prevalent both in the literature and in activism. 
Possibly the most common, and the favourite of vegetarians and People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA) is the ethical argument, whereby they argue that it is immoral to harm animals 
while raising them for meat and by killing them for meat (cf. Berndsen & Van der Pligt 2005). 
Another common argument, outlined above, is that conventional meat production is very harmful to 
the environment (c.f. Berndsen & Van der Pligt, 2004; Steinfeld et al., 2006). A final argument is 
that a vegan diet is healthier, and therefore by association a low-meat diet is also healthier. This is 
the focus of the fad diet, Skinny Bitch (Freedman & Barnouin, 2005) and a controversial new PETA 
advertisement (PETA claim a vegan diet will increase men's virility; 2012). The health argument is 
also supported by the American Dietetic Association and the Dietitians of Canada (2003). I should 
note that most of the arguments that apply to reducing meat consumption apply to all animal 
products; raising cows for meat or dairy makes little difference to the environment or their welfare 
(dairy cows are also killed after only a few years), however for the sake of simplicity, I will focus 
only on meat consumption. There are many other arguments in favour of reducing meat 
consumption, but this is meant to be a paper on the effects of activism, not activism itself.
Meat consumption is associated with a more affective than cognitive attitude (Aikman, Crites and 
Fabrigar, 2006; Berndsen & Van der Pligt, 2005) as vegetarians often cite taste and ethics for their 
dietary choices (Hoek et al., 2011; Povey, et al., 2001; Stockburger, et al., 2009). For this reason, I 
expect the ethical argument to produce the most attitude and intention change. Previous research 
has shown that people are more motivated to perform actions if they have a vested interest in the 
outcome (for review see Ajzen, 2005). In a recent study, Scrimgeour and Helton (in press) found 
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that sustainable transport use was associated, not with greater environmental awareness, but with a 
greater belief in the health benefits of cycling, walking, carpooling or bussing. Therefore, I expect 
the health argument to be next most effective, followed by the environmental one. 
To sum, the first hypothesis is that information will be successful at changing attitudes and 
intentions to consume meat, but successive arguments will decrease in effectiveness over time, and 
may even eventually reverse their effects such that participants’ attitudes start to become more pro-
meat and participants indicate an intention to consume more meat. A related hypothesis is that 
measures of belief in the argument will decrease over time, exhibiting an increase in defensiveness. 
The next hypothesis is that the ethical argument should be the most effective at producing behaviour 
change, followed by the health argument, then the environmental one. I will also explore the data 
with regression analyses to determine if any variables predict attitude and intention changes toward 
meat consumption.
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Method
Participants performed the experiment online using Qualtrics. They completed demographic 
questions, the Moral Judgement Test (MJT; Lind, 2008, 2009), baseline measurements of meat 
consumption, attitudes towards meat, and intentions to change meat consumption in the future. 
They then saw either an environmental, health, or ethical argument against consuming meat, and 
responded to the argument with questions about belief in the argument, attitude, and intention 
change. The argument presentation and response was completed two more times such that each 
participant read and responded to all three arguments, but in a counterbalanced order to minimize 
order effects.
The questionnaire was administered online for several reasons. Online questionnaires allow the 
researcher to skip the data transcription step, because data files are downloaded from the internet, 
thus saving time and limiting errors. They also allow easier dissemination to an international 
sample, and increase ease of participation which increases participant numbers (cf. Wright, 2005). 
Participant recruitment can also be very fast. In this case, recruiting over 400 participants and 
running the experiment took less than a week. Aside from minor sampling issues (under- 
representation of elderly and low income populations), web-based surveys have no limitations that 
do not also exist for mailed surveys (Riva, Teruzzi & Anolli, 2003; Wright, 2005). The ease of 
collecting data online and the large participant numbers available was an acceptable trade-off for 
selecting this procedure. 
Participants
The sample of convenience was recruited using the university Psychology and Geography mailing 
lists, as well as by “snowballing” through email and social media. In the snowball technique, 
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participants themselves recruit their friends and family into the study. This technique does not 
provide a true random sample, but does provide a more diverse range of participants than simply 
relying on undergraduate psychology students. Participants (n=363, female = 68%) were adults 
(mean age = 27.83, SD = 13.67). The eldest participant in the current study was 96 years old, and 
the next eldest was 84, so despite sampling concerns with web-based research, elderly people in this 
experiment seem to be better represented than in the majority of university-based psychology 
experiments. The sample was reasonably well educated: 1.1% did not graduate from high school, 
54.1% had completed high school, 33.9% had completed a tertiary qualification, and 10.9% had 
completed at least one post-graduate qualification. Vegetarians comprised 10.4% of the sample, 
which is consistent with population averages in developed Western nations. Most participants were 
currently living in New Zealand (76.8%) or Canada (19.6%), with the remaining 3.6% in the United 
States, Australia, Argentina, Germany, UK, Singapore and Sweden.
Some participants discontinued before completion; 434 participants started the questionnaire, but 71 
dropped out before starting the experimental section. This could have been due to technical 
problems, boredom, or interruptions. It is easier to close a browser window on an anonymous online 
study than it is to get up and walk out of an experiment when the researcher is present. Though the 
survey software allowed people to save their responses to finish later, not all participants noticed or 
took advantage of the function. None the less, of the 363 participants who started the experimental 
section of the questionnaire (viewing and responding to the arguments), only 10 dropped out before 
finishing it. For these participants, an intention to treat paradigm was used; participants were 
assumed not to have changed over time, thus in any time-based analyses, responses to the previous 
questions were used to fill in missing responses to subsequent questions. A logistic regression 
analysis of participant drop outs on MJT score, age, gender, education, meat consumption, social 
norm, attitudes, PBC, and ambivalence was significant, Cox & Snell R2 = .05, χ2 (8) = 16.72, p < .
05. Participants were more likely to drop out who had more pro-meat attitudes (B = .72, p = .05), 
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and high ambivalence towards meat (B = .78, p < .05). Implications are included in the discussion.
Arguments
Participants viewed three arguments were presented, outlining respectively environmental, health, 
and ethical arguments for reducing meat consumption. Though the content of the arguments 
necessarily differed, the formatting was the same for all three (cf. Obermiller, 1995). Following 
each argument was an identical paragraph designed to increase self-efficacy with tips on plant-
based protein sources. Because most participants were expected to be from Canada or New Zealand, 
the arguments were framed for these audiences. The arguments were evaluated for their Flesch-
Kincaid grade level and reading ease using an online tool (Child, n.d.), and adjusted so their 
difficulty was as similar as possible.  The environmental argument had a reading ease of 35.8 
(range: 0 – 100, higher is easier to read), and a grade level of 16; health had a reading ease of 36.7 
and a grade level of 14.2; and ethical had a reading ease of 55.7 and a grade level of 10.9. Though 
not perfect, the scores indicate that the arguments were roughly similar in reading difficulty.
Environmental. The environmental argument was based mainly on the report by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (UN FAO). The citation, UN FAO (2006), actually 
refers to Steinfeld et al. (2006). UN FAO was used as the citation in the argument because a 
reference list was unavailable to participants, and a citation from the UN was likely to be more 
meaningful than the primary author. The other citations were written according to convention 
because the organizations that produced the reports were unlikely to be recognized by an 
international sample. The argument against eating meat was as follows:
Eating too much meat causes problems for the environment according to the Food and 
Agriculture  Organization  of  the  United  Nations  (UN FAO,  2006).  Meat  production 
produces 18% of global greenhouse gas emissions; more than the entire transport sector 
14
DIGITAL PERSUASION Laura Scrimgeour
(UN FAO, 2006). The Amazon rainforest is being cut down to graze animals – 70% of 
the deforested land is now used for grazing, in addition to large amounts of land being 
used to grow animal feed (UN FAO, 2006). Meat production is also one of the biggest 
causes of species extinctions because of ecosystems being destroyed for pasture and 
grain  production,  degraded  pasture  from over-grazing,  and  contributions  to  climate 
change (UN FAO, 2006). Factory farming and grazing animals are leading causes of 
water  pollution in New Zealand and Canada (Hall,  Leavitt,  Quinlan,  Dixit  & Smol, 
1999; Unwin, Snelder, Booker, Ballantine & Lessard, 2010; Verburg, Hamill, Unwin & 
Abell,  2010).  Technological  advances  and  better  management  can  reduce  the 
environmental  impacts  of  meat  production  (UN  FAO,  2006),  but  by  far  the  most 
effective and immediate improvements can be achieved simply by consuming less meat. 
If every omnivore in developed nations ate at least one more vegetarian or vegan meal 
each week, emissions and other impacts of meat production could be reduced by nearly 
15% in just a few months.
Health. The health argument against eating meat was as follows:
Eating too much meat causes problems for your health according to a recent review by 
Fraser (2009), the American Dietetic Association and the Dietitians of Canada (2003). 
Vegetarians  have  a  lower  risk  for  heart  disease,  obesity,  colon  and prostate  cancer, 
diabetes,  high  cholesterol,  and  hypertension  than  omnivores  (American  Dietetic 
Association, 2003; Fraser, 2009). Animal products are high in unhealthy saturated fats, 
which should be avoided to maintain a  healthy weight  (Health Canada,  2007;  New 
Zealand Ministry of Health [MOH], 2005; World Health Organization, n.d.), and are not 
necessary for a healthy diet as long as a variety of pulses (legumes; beans, dried peas, 
lentils),  nuts,  seeds,  whole-grains,  fruits  and  vegetables  are  consumed  (American 
Dietetic Association, 2003; MOH, 2005). Health Canada (2007) recommends frequently 
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replacing  meat  with  pulses  (legumes)  and  tofu.  A diet  rich  in  whole-grains,  beans, 
lentils, nuts, seeds, leafy greens and vitamin C will contain adequate protein and iron 
(MOH,  2005).  In  addition,  vegetarian  diets  are  often  lower  in  saturated  fats  and 
cholesterol than omnivorous diets, and are higher in fibre, vitamins C and E, and other 
essential nutrients (American Dietetic Association, 2003). As a result,  reducing meat 
consumption by at least one meal per week should help a person to lose weight and 
reduce the risks for a wide range of deadly diseases. 
Ethical. In my opinion it is impossible to legally research the living conditions of factory farmed 
animals without first gaining employment in the meat industry. The standard conditions are not 
publicised, probably because the industry knows that they would discourage people from eating 
meat. Instead, the laws and official publications use the term “industry standard.” Farm visits are 
possible, but access to the entire facility is almost never granted, so visitors see only what farm 
operators are willing for them to see. Therefore information about living conditions comes from 
activists who have usually obtained the information illegally. In the interest of fairness, and to avoid 
traumatising participants, I assumed the information obtained was biased, and I did not report the 
worst animal rights infractions. I would like to note however, that researchers should be careful of 
their own mental status when doing investigations of this kind, because the evidence of animal 
cruelty you are likely to see is truly horrific. If, like me, you do eat some meat, it can be very 
difficult to work on a report if your unconscious is trying to repress it. The argument shown to 
participants is as follows:
Eating too much meat causes problems for the ethical treatment of farm animals. To 
meet a growing consumer demand, in New Zealand pigs and poultry (chickens, turkeys) 
are often raised in factory farms (Ministry of Agriculture and Farming, 2009). Over
90% of all meat produced in Canada comes from factory farms (MacLachlan, 2011). 
Factory farms are industrial meat-production facilities where animals are treated like 
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step in a production line. The animals are crowded so tightly they can barely move and 
are denied access to sunlight, fresh air and pasture. The factories are often so full of 
manure  that  respiratory problems  and  other  diseases  are  frequent.  These  conditions 
stress the animals and make them more likely to fight, so often poultry have their beaks 
cut off and pigs are confined to crates so they cannot interact with each other. In New 
Zealand and Canada pregnant and lactating pigs are commonly confined to tiny crates, 
so small they cannot move around. If dogs or cats were treated as farm animals are, 
their owners would be charged with cruelty to animals. Farm animals exhibit behaviours 
that in a human would be interpreted as fear, stress, pain, despair and sadness. They 
deserve to be treated with respect, allowed to move freely, and exhibit natural foraging 
and play behaviours for their short lives. Until laws are changed to protect these animals 
from needless cruelty, the best thing people can do for them is to refuse to support cruel 
farming practices by refusing to buy factory farmed meat. Eating beans instead of meat 
for supper at least once each week will reduce the demand for factory farmed meat and 
will help to save thousands of animals from needless cruelty.
Plant-based protein sources.  This paragraph followed each of the arguments, and thus was seen 
three times by all participants. It was designed to increase PBC by tackling the barriers outlined in 
previous research:
Eating less meat doesn't mean you (or your family) have to become vegetarian. You can 
eat beans, lentils, seeds, nuts or tofu instead of meat at one meal each week, or include 
them in two meals and eat half the meat you normally would at those meals. Replacing 
half the meat with a serving of beans at two meals is just as effective as eating one 
vegetarian meal, and is less likely to leave you feeling hungry later. Vegetarian protein 
sources like beans, nuts, seeds, lentils, or tofu are easy to add to meals like chilli, soups,  
stews, curries, salads and stir fries. Any reduction in your meat consumption, no matter 
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how small, will have a positive effect.
Measures
Questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of a demographic section, the MJT (Lind, 2008; 2009), 
baseline measurements of attitudes and behaviour, and an experimental section with three 
arguments against consuming meat presented in a counterbalanced order. The experiment was 
designed for both Canadians and New Zealanders, but in such a way as it could be completed by 
anyone who reads English. The full questionnaire is available in appendix A.
In accordance with the procedures of Hoek et al., (2011), and Lea and Worsley (2008), demographic 
variables were measured including age, gender, education level. Since the source of meat in each 
country varies, and therefore so does its environmental impacts, health implications, and ethical 
considerations, country of residence was also asked. Hoek et al. (2011) measured the number of 
children in the household, however our sample consisted largely of childless university students, 
who, in Canada and New Zealand, vary on whether they share meals as a household, so rather than 
ask about children, or household members, I asked about the number of people with whom they 
regularly shared meals, and whether those people had any dietary restrictions. 
The MJT (Lind, 2008; 2009) assess participants' ability to judge the validity of an argument, 
regardless of their personal position on the issue. In accordance with Lind’s instructions, the MJT 
was inserted into the questionnaire directly after demographic measurements.
The definition for “meat” was modified slightly from Hoek et al. (2011) to read: 
The term meat refers to all meat products eaten, varying from steak and schnitzel to 
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cubes of ham, pieces of bacon or minced or ground meat in sauces. It also includes cold 
meat products used for sandwiches such as salami or ham. Meat also includes wild 
game and poultry such as chicken or turkey, but for the purposes of this survey does not 
include fish or eggs.
Following Berndsen and Van der Pligt's recommendations (2004), meat consumption was measured 
with ‘on average, how often do you eat meat with your 'evening' meal?’ Participants indicated 
whether they ate meat ‘never or nearly never, less than once a week, once or twice, three or four  
times, five or six times, or daily’ then indicated how much they normally ate by selecting one of ‘an 
amount smaller than a deck of cards (less than 75g), about the size of  One  deck of cards (75 –  
150g), about the size of  Two  decks of cards (151 – 225g), about the size of  Three  decks of cards  
(226 – 300g), More than  Three  decks of cards (more than 300g).’ The deck of cards analogy is a 
portion control aid commonly used by Weight Watchers, and is therefore familiar to many people; it 
was used to increase the accuracy of portion estimates. These two questions were repeated for the 
'mid day' and 'morning' meal. The meals were referred to by time of day because New Zealanders 
have 'tea', at the same hour as Canadians have 'supper,' which is more commonly referred to by 
Canadians as 'dinner', but in some countries 'dinner' refers to 'lunch'. Participants who reported 
eating no meat were allowed to skip the questions measuring meat consumption. 
Ambivalence is usually defined as the presence of variance in a person's attitude towards an object 
(Sparks, Conner, James, Shepherd, & Povey, 2001). It can be conceptualised as the presence of 
concurrent conflicting attitudes, e.g. “red meat is high in iron” and “red meat is associated with 
heart disease and cancer,” or as attitudes conflicting along a temporal continuum (Sparks et al., 
2001), constituting a self-control problem; “I want cake because it tastes good, but if I eat it I won't 
fit into my wedding dress.” Ambivalence can have either a mediating effect (Berndsen & Van der 
Pligt, 2004), or a moderating effect (Sparks et al., 2001) on the relationship between attitudes and 
meat consumption. I measured it with three questions, simplified from Priester and Petty (1996): 'I  
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feel conflicted about eating meat', 'I feel indecisive towards the issue of eating meat' and 'I have 
completely clear reactions towards the issue of eating meat.' Meat eaters report dramatically more 
ambivalence towards eating meat than vegetarians do to their own diets (Berndsen & Van der Pligt, 
unpublished pilot, 2001; cited in Berndsen & Van der Pligt 2004; Povey, Wellens & Connor, 2001). 
Ambivalence towards eating meat affects meat consumption both independently (by making 
attitudes easier to change), and through a mediating effect on attitudes towards meat consumption 
(Berndsen & Van der Pligt, 2004).  
Beliefs about the arguments presented were measured with the same questions as Berndsen and Van 
der Pligt (2004) used for a manipulation check: 'How much did the information convince you?', 'Do 
you agree with the content?', 'How informative was it for you?'. I also asked 'Did the last paragraph 
[about plant-based proteins] help you feel more able to eat less meat', 'How truthful did the  
argument seem?' and 'How much of the information was new to you?' All the measures of belief 
correlated strongly with each other, with the exception of 'how much of the information was new to  
you?' (see table 1). Since the pattern of correlations were very similar at times one, two and three, 
only time one is shown in table 1. Both the Eigenvalues and the scree plot of a principal component 
analysis returned two components. An unrotated factor analysis with two factors extracted showed 
that all questions except 'how much of the information was new to you?' loaded most strongly on the 
first factor (see table 2), therefore that question was removed from subsequent analyses. Factors one 
and two together explained 52.07% of the total variance. The resulting measure, belief in the 
argument is intended to be used as a proxy measure for denial. The question of whether it truly 
measures denial is a difficult one. Many self-report measures of defense mechanisms have been 
developed, however they have all been found to have problems with reliability (Cramer, 2000). 
Defense mechanisms by definition are unconscious reactions, and therefore only the symptoms 
(such as denial of the validity of an argument) can be measured. Many self-report personality scales 
in reality measure defense mechanisms (see Cramer, 2000), and I believe that asking participants 
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how much they believe in the transparent argument I presented them should in fact measure 
defensiveness (nothing said in any of the arguments was known to be untrue). Thus I believe this 
approach to be a reasonable measure of defense mechanisms and coping strategies
Table 1: 
Correlations of measures of beliefs in the argument at time one
Variable Agreement Informative
Helped with 
PBC Truthfulness Novelty
Convincingness .56*** .46*** .58*** 0.45*** 0.13*
Agreement .36*** .40*** .62*** -.15**
Informative .38*** .34*** .38***
Helped with 
PBC
.36*** .14**
Truthfulness     -.07
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
Table 2: 
Component matrix of belief questions
Component
1 2
Convincingness .827 .036
Agreement .777 -.401
Informative .679 .449
Helped with 
PBC
.729 .110
Truthfulness .726 -.342
Novelty .161 .901
The Theory of Planned Behavior. According to Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior 
(1991, 2005; Ajzen & Albarracín 2010), attitudes, social norms, and PBC combine to influence 
intentions about whether or not to perform a specific behaviour. As long as unforeseen barriers do 
not get in the way, the individual is likely to follow through on that intention and perform the 
behaviour. Questions about participants' attitudes, social norms, and perceived behaviour control 
towards meat were carefully balanced (pro and anti meat) to avoid alienating participants or 
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indicating preference for one answer or another. 
Participants indicated their attitudes towards eating meat on a five point scale using Berndsen and 
Van der Pligt's (2004) semantic variables, 'bad/good', 'unpleasant/pleasant', 'against/for', 
'unfavourable/favourable', 'negative/positive', in addition to 'eco/un-eco', 'healthy/unhealthy', 
'moral/immoral'. The correlation matrix of all the attitudinal variables showed that all were highly 
correlated, and the pattern of correlations was similar across baseline and times one through three, 
so only the correlations from time one are shown in table 3. A scree plot from a principal 
component analysis clearly showed only one component. This component accounted for 73.91% of 
the variance. An unrotated factor analysis with a single factor extracted showed all variables loading 
on the single factor.
Table 3: 
Correlation matrix of attitudinal variables at time one
Semantic 
Attitude 
Variables
Bad / 
Good
Unpleasant 
/ Pleasant
Against 
/ For
Unfavourable 
/ Favourable
Negative 
/ Positive
Un-
eco / 
eco
Unhealthy 
/ Healthy
Bad / Good
Unpleasant / 
Pleasant
.78*
Against / For .89* .67*
Unfavourable 
/ Favourable
.87* .81* .90*
Negative / 
Positive
.89* .75* .89* .90*
Un-eco / eco .69* .55* .68* .70* .69*
Unhealthy / 
Healthy
.70* .61* .69* .70* .69* .62*
Immoral / 
Moral
.76* .64* .77* .77* .77* .71* .63*
* p < .001
Social norms have (at least) two distinct conceptualisations in the literature. Hoek et al. measured 
them with “my fellow household members don’t like to eat these products” (2011, p. 666), whereas 
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Berndsen and Van der Pligt, used the more traditional two-factor approach for the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour: “'people who are important to me think that I should eat meat'... [and] 'how 
much do you want to do what these important people think you should?'” (2004, p.74). Hoek's 
approach appears to straddle the boundary between PBC and social norms, so Bernsden and Van der 
Plight's two question method was used. The question was asked two ways; 'people who are 
important to me think that I should eat less [more] meat'. For simplicity the second half of the 
question was rewritten: 'I want to do what these people want me to do'. 
PBC was measured by asking participants about their abilities to eat more or less meat: 'if I wanted 
to eat more [less] meat I could overcome any obstacles in my path', 'I know how or can easily learn 
how to cook meatless main courses [main courses containing meat]', and 'if I wanted to I  
could...reduce [increase] my meat consumption / cook more [fewer] meals containing meat'. The 
questions were balanced this way to reduce reactions to vegetarianism.
Intentions were measured with the question 'in the future, do you intend to... eat more / the same 
amount / less meat', similarly to the method used by Berndsen and Van der Pligt (2004). Though 
intentions are at best a poor proxy for behaviour, they are important in the environmental literature 
because they represent a willingness to take ownership of a problem which is a “commons 
dilemma” (see Gifford, 2007). Often environmental solutions are framed as things “other people” 
should do; closing coal power plants, reducing agrichemicals, stopping whaling, etc. Without 
risking arrest, the average person has very little direct influence on any of these actions. One of the 
most frequent statements I hear when discussing sustainable forms of transport (walking, cycling, 
bussing, carpooling, motorcycling) is “yes, but I need my car because...” as if the person I'm talking 
to has rare needs or responsibilities that other people don't have. To be fair, a few people do have 
rare needs or responsibilities which preclude ever using sustainable transport, Queen Elizabeth II 
for example, but most do not. While I appreciate that there are many real barriers to sustainable 
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transport, it is up to individuals to take responsibility for their own actions whenever possible. In 
this manner even actions that could be performed by individuals are often dismissed as something 
that “other people” should do. Therefore an indication of willingness to change one's own behaviour 
is important.
Thus to sum, participants filled in a questionnaire consisting of demographics, the MJT, and 
baseline measures of meat consumption, attitudes towards meat consumption, and intentions to 
consume meat in future. They then viewed three arguments against meat consumption and answered 
questions about their belief in the argument, attitudes, and intentions after each argument. The 
questions were balanced to have equal numbers pro- and anti-meat to avoid influencing participants, 
and the argument presentation order was counterbalanced to minimise order effects.
24
DIGITAL PERSUASION Laura Scrimgeour
Results
Changes over time
The first order of business was to test the hypothesis that the arguments had a negative effect on 
attitudes towards meat and intentions to consume meat. Sphericity was violated both for attitudes W 
= .49, χ2 (5) = 230.28, p < .001, and intentions, W = .65, χ2 (5) = 138.92, p < .001, however unless 
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction changed the significance, the uncorrected results are reported 
below. Repeated measures ANOVAs showed that attitudes towards meat decreased over time, F (3,  
1002) = 81.31, p < .001 (see figure 1), and as hypothesised, participants changed their intentions to 
eat less meat over time, F (3, 1002) = 10.23, p < .001 (see figure 2). Gender and condition (order of 
argument presentation) were entered into the model as between-subjects variables. Men had 
significantly more favourable attitudes towards meat, F (1, 334) = 14.53, p < .001, and intended to 
consume more of it, F (1, 334) = 11.67, p = .001. There was no effect of conditions either for 
attitudes, F (5, 334) = .36, p = n.s., or intentions, F (5, 334) = .02, p = n.s., indicating that any 
order effects were adequately controlled. A significant time x gender interaction indicated that 
women's attitudes changed more over time than men's (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F (2,  
667.71) = 4.68, p = .01, (see figure 2),  but there was no corresponding time x gender interaction 
for intentions, F (3, 1002) = .37, p = n.s. In the case of intentions, the change appears to be 
curvilinear, such that change occurs dramatically to the first argument, somewhat to the second, and 
very little to the third.  The change in attitudes also appears to be curvilinear, however it is also 
possible that changes from the first argument onward are linear. In both the case of attitudes and 
intentions, if the curve continues, the maximum possible score (Max intentions = 3, Max attitude = 
0) will never occur.
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Figure 1: Intentions to reduce meat consumption over time (higher values reflect intentions to 
reduce meat consumption)
Figure 2: Decreases in attitude over time (higher values reflect more pro-meat attitudes)
Belief in the arguments also decreased significantly over time, F (2, 690) = 3.38, p < .05. There 
was not a significant decrease from time one to time two, t (345) = 1.22, p = n.s., nor from time two 
to three, t (345) = 1.46, p = n.s., however, there was a significant decrease in belief between time 
one and three, t (345) = -2.47, p < .05. The change in belief over time appears to be linear.
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Figure 3: Decreases in belief in the argument over time as a result of viewing arguments against 
meat consumption (lower values reflect less belief in the argument)
Differential Effectiveness of the Arguments
A second question of interest was whether one argument would prove more or less effective than 
the others. RM ANOVAs confirmed that attitudes decreased significantly between baseline and at 
least one of the arguments, F (3, 1005) = 87.70, p < .001 (see figure 4). Attitudes decreased 
significantly from baseline after viewing the arguments, each for the environmental, t (335) = 
11.13, p < .001 (d = .62), health, t (335) = 10.79, p < .001 (d = .59), and ethical arguments t (335)  
= 11.81, p < .001 (d = .65). The environmental and health arguments were equally effective at 
producing attitude change, t (335) = .28, p = n.s (d = .00), whereas the ethical argument was more 
effective than both the health t (335) = 2.99, p < .01 (d = .16), and environmental argument, t (335)  
= 3.50, p < .01 (d = .18). Effect sizes were calculated using Cepeda's (2008) online calculator 
which corrects for within-subjects data.
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Figure 4: Decreases in attitude as a result of each argument (higher values reflect more pro-meat 
attitudes)
Intentions to reduce meat consumption also increased significantly from baseline after viewing the 
arguments, (RM ANOVA) F (3, 1005) = 16.23, p < .001, each for the environmental, t (335) = 
-4.66, p < .001 (d = .27), health, t (335) = 10.79, p < .001 (d = .59), and ethical arguments t (335)  
= 11.81, p < .001 (d = .65) (see figure 5). Again, the environmental and health arguments were 
about equally effective at changing intention, t (335) = .93, p = n.s (d = .07), as were the ethical 
and environmental arguments, t (335) = 1.71, p = n.s (d = .08), however the ethical argument was 
more effective than the health at changing intentions, t (335) = -2.74, p < .01 (d = .16). 
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Figure 5: Increase in intentions to reduce meat consumption as a result of each argument
Beliefs in the argument were examined in the same manner. A RM ANOVA showed that the 
arguments did differ in “believability”, F (3, 670) = 14.93, p < .001 (see figure 6). Participants 
believed approximately equally in the environmental and ethical arguments, t (335) = 1.25, p = n.s  
(d = .07), and less in the health argument than either the environmental, t (335) = -3.21, p < .01 (d  
= .18), or ethical arguments, t (335) = 5.50, p < .001 (d = .32). 
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Figure 6: Belief in the different arguments.
To examine whether one argument performed “best” overall, summed outcome measures were 
generated for each argument from attitudes, intentions, and beliefs. The arguments were 
significantly different overall, F (2, 670) = 16.48, p < .001. The ethical argument scored “best” on 
outcomes measures, followed by the environmental argument, t (335) = -2.63, p < .01 (d = .14),  
then by health, t (335) = -3.21, p < .01 (d=.18). 
Predicting beliefs, attitudes, and intention change
Regression analyses were used to examine predictor variables on belief in the argument, attitudes, 
and changes in intention to consume meat. Variables were centred (Frazier, Tix & Barron, 2004), 
then examined for their individual predictive value, and for mediator and moderator effects (see 
Baron & Kenny, 1986; Frazier, Tix & Barron, 2004). 
A regression of belief in the environmental argument (enter method) on baseline attitudes, social 
norms, PBC, meat consumption, gender, age, education, and ambivalence, R2= .17, F (9, 328) = 
7.33, p < .001, revealed that belief in the argument was negatively predicted by age and pro-meat 
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attitudes (see table 4). Regressing belief in the ethical argument on the same variables, R2 = .20, F 
(9, 332) = 9.19, p < .001, also revealed significant negative prediction by pro-meat attitudes and 
age. Belief in the health argument was regressed likewise, R2 = .19, F (9, 324) = 8.55, p < .001, but 
instead was negatively predicted by pro-meat attitude and education (higher education resulted in 
less belief) (see table 4).
Table 4 
Predictors of belief in the arguments
Argument Predictor variable B SE B β
Environmental
Baseline attitude** -.27 .07 -.33
Age* -.01 .00 -.12
Gender  .13 .10  .07
Social Norm  .01 .01  .05
Ambivalence  .03 .05  .04
Meat consumption -.01 .04 -.03
Education  .02 .04  .02
PBC -.04 .08 -.02
MJT score -.00 .00 -.02
Ethic
Baseline attitude** -.28 .07 -.33
Age* -.01 .00 -.14
Gender  .19 .10  .10
Education -.06 .04 -.09
Ambivalence  .05 .05  .06
PBC -.08 .08 -.05
Social Norm  .01 .01  .03
MJT score -.00 .00 -.03
Meat consumption  .01 .04  .01
Health
Baseline attitude** -.30 .07 -.36
Education* -.09 .04 -.13
Social Norm  .02 .02  .07
Gender  .19 .10  .05
Ambivalence  .02 .06  .03
Meat consumption -.02 .04 -.03
MJT score -.00 .00 -.03
PBC -.03 .08 -.02
Age  .00 .00  .00
Note: enter method
* p < .05
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** p < .001
Dividing participants into old (n = 115) and young (n = 188) age groups at 23 years (there was a 
pronounced decrease in frequency at age 23; median age = 22), and removing vegetarians from the 
analyses revealed that young omnivores found the ethical argument more believable than old 
omnivores, (see figure 7) F (1, 304) = 8.50, p < .01. There was no corresponding difference, 
between age groups for belief in the environmental, F (1, 301) = 2.67, p = n.s., or health arguments, 
F (1, 297) = .47, p = n.s. 
Figure 7: Belief in the different arguments by age of participants.
Because attitudes and intentions were both measured after each argument, it was possible to test 
which variables predicted post-test attitude and intention change. The predictors of attitudes and 
intentions were examined using regressions for simple predictive effects, as well as mediator and 
moderator effects. Ambivalence was examined in an attempt to illuminate and replicate its reported 
role as a mediator (Berndsen & Van der Pligt, 2004) and moderator (Sparks et al., 2001). Attitudes 
were tested using four steps, each using the enter method. The first step contained demographic and 
baseline variables: baseline attitude, social norm, PBC, MJT score, meat consumption, gender, age, 
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and education. In the second and third steps, belief in the argument and ambivalence were added 
respectively to test for mediation effects. The fourth step added the following potential moderators 
of the relationship between baseline attitude and post-argument attitude: ambivalence, gender, MJT 
score, and beliefs in the argument (see table 5). This process was repeated for the environmental, 
ethical, and health arguments, however, since the results were essentially the same, only the 
regression for the environmental argument is shown (see appendix B for the regressions of attitudes 
after the health and ethical arguments).
Table 5 
Predictors of post-environmental argument attitudes
Step Predictor variable B SE B β Model R2 R2 change
1
Baseline attitude***  .95 .03  .92
Gender** -.17 .06 -.07
Age*  .00 .00  .05
Social Norm -.02 .01 -.05
Meat consumption -.02 .02 -.04
PBC  .03 .04  .01
MJT score  .00 .00  .01
Education -.02 .02 -.03 .84*** .84***
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Belief in environmental argument*** -.23 .03 -.18 .86*** .03***
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Ambivalence -.05 .03 -.05 .87*** .00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Ambivalence x baseline attitude -.03 .02 -.03
Gender x baseline attitude -.07 .05 -.12
MJT score x baseline attitude  .00 .00  .00
Belief in argument x baseline attitude* -.06 .03 -.05 .87*** .01*
Notes: enter method used
All variables are carried over from the previous to the next step, but for the sake of brevity are not 
reproduced a second time. Any significant changes in variables from one step to the next are 
reported in the text.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
For the all three arguments, pro-meat baseline attitude, male gender, and older age predicted more 
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positive post-argument attitudes towards meat. Belief in the argument also predicted post-argument 
attitude, as well as mediated the relationship between age and post-argument attitude, such that 
when belief was entered into the model, age was no longer significant. No other mediator effects 
occurred. Belief in the argument also moderated the relationship between baseline attitudes and 
post-argument attitudes, such that when belief in the argument was low, baseline attitudes predicted 
post-argument attitudes, but when belief in the argument was high, baseline attitudes were no longer 
predictive of post-argument attitudes. This same pattern occurred for the environmental and ethical 
arguments. The only exception occurred in the health regression where belief did not mediate the 
effect of age on post-argument attitude; age remained a significant predictor when belief was added 
to the regression (see appendix).
Changes in intentions to consume meat were examined by generating change scores (baseline 
intention subtracted from post-argument intention). The models were similar to the ones predicting 
attitudes, with belief in the argument, social norms, MJT score, PBC, meat consumption, gender, 
education and age in the first step, followed by post-argument attitude and ambivalence in the 
second and third steps respectively. The fourth step consisted of interactions with post-argument 
attitudes: ambivalence, MJT score, gender, and baseline attitude. This process was repeated for the 
environmental (table 5), health (table 6), and ethical (table 7) arguments. 
In all cases intention change was predicted by higher meat consumption and greater belief in the 
argument. Post-argument attitude may also influence intentions to consume meat in tandem with 
ambivalence because pro-meat attitude was only a significant predictor of intentions (all arguments) 
when ambivalence was part of the model, but low ambivalence predicted intentions to consume less 
meat only in response to the health argument (table 6). Ambivalence was not a significant predictor 
either for the ethical (p = .07), or the environmental arguments (p = .14). 
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Table 5 
Predictors of intention change in response to the environmental argument
Step Predictor variable B SE B β Model R2 R2 change
1 Beliefs in environmental argument***  .09 .03  .21
Meat consumption*  .03 .01  .13
Age -.00 .00 -.09
Social Norm  .01 .01  .08
Gender  .04 .04  .05
PBC -.01 .04 -.02
MJT score  .00 .00  .01
Education  .00 .02  .02 .07** .07**
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Post-argument attitude -.05 .03 -.14 .08** .01
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Ambivalence -.04 .02 -.10
Post-argument attitude* -.06 .03 -.18 .09** .01
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Ambivalence x post-argument attitude  .04 .02  .10
MJT score x post-argument attitude  .00 .00 -.01
Gender x post-argument attitude -.08 .04 -.39
Baseline attitude x post-argument attitude -.01 .02 -.03 .10** .01
Notes: enter method used
All variables are carried over from the previous to the next step, but for the sake of brevity are not 
reproduced a second time unless significant changes occurred.
* p < .05
** p < .01
Table 6 
Predictors of intention change in response to the health argument
Step Predictor variable B SE B β Model R2 R2 change
1 Beliefs in ethical argument***  .09 .02  .22
Meat consumption*  .03 .01  .14
Age -.00 .00 -.03
Social Norm  .01 .01  .08
Gender  .05 .04  .07
PBC -.03 .04 -.05
MJT score  .00 .00 -.02
Education  .00 .02  .01 .07** .07**
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Post-argument attitude -.04 .03 -.13 .08** .01
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Ambivalence* -.05 .02 -.15
Post-argument attitude* -.08 .03 -.23 .09*** .02*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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4 Ambivalence x post-argument attitude  .04 .02  .12
MJT score x post-argument attitude  .00 .00  .00
Gender x post-argument attitude -.08 .04 -.44
Baseline attitude x post-argument attitude  .00 .02 -.00 .11** .02
Notes: enter method used
All variables are carried over from the previous to the next step, but for the sake of brevity are not 
reproduced a second time unless significant changes occurred.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
Table 7 
Predictors of intention change in response to the ethical argument
Step Predictor variable B SE B β Model R2 R2 change
1 Belief in ethical argument**  .09 .03  .20
Meat consumption**  .02 .01  .11
Social Norm*  .01 .01  .11
Age  .00 .00 -.01
Gender  .04 .05  .04
PBC -.04 .04 -.06
MJT score  .00 .00 -.01
Education -.01 .02 -.03 .07** .07**
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Post-argument attitude -.04 .03 -.12
Social Norm  .02 .01  .10 .08** .01
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Ambivalence -.05 .02 -.15
Post-argument attitude** -.04 .03 -.12 .09** .01
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Ambivalence x post-argument attitude  .04 .02  .10
MJT score x post-argument attitude  .00 .00 -.01
Gender x post-argument attitude -.07 .04 -.40
Baseline attitude x post-argument attitude -.01 .02 -.03 .10** .01
Notes: enter method used
All variables are carried over from the previous to the next step, but for the sake of brevity are not 
reproduced a second time unless significant changes occurred.
* p < .05
** p < .01
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Discussion
As hypothesized, arguments against meat consumption were successful at changing participants’ 
attitudes towards meat. Attitudes decreased dramatically in response to the first argument, but from 
there decreased only slightly after each successive argument. The progression over time appears to 
be a negative curve, though it is possible that attitudes decreased linearly from the first argument 
onward. A curvilinear progression would indicate denial, as participants “shut down” and failed to 
make the same degree of attitude change they made to previous arguments. If participants did not 
become defensive, one would expect attitudes and intentions to continue to change in at least a 
linear, or perhaps even in an exponentially increasing function, as arguments with different foci 
converged to form a convincing body of evidence for reducing meat consumption. This effect 
occurred without regard for the subject of the argument (because of counterbalancing); thus was a 
saturation effect. A secondary hypothesis was that participants would react to the barrage of 
arguments by eventually reversing their attitudes and intention change (attitudes would become 
more pro-meat, and intentions to consume less meat would decrease), but this did not occur.
Women started the experiment with more negative attitudes towards meat, and their attitudes 
changed more dramatically than men's. Even in modern households women often make the majority 
of food purchase and preparation decisions, so changing their attitudes might be more important 
than changing men's. The difference in attitudes did not correspond, however, with a greater change 
in intention for women. This suggests that a barrier may exist for women that prevents their greater 
attitude change from transferring to greater intention change. A focus group may be able to pinpoint 
this barrier, since women must be aware of it for it to influence intention change (rather than an 
unanticipated barrier that can affect behaviour change). This would be an interesting topic for future 
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research.
In keeping with the other hypothesis, intentions to reduce meat consumption increased in response 
to the arguments. Like attitudes, intention change over time progressed in a curvilinear fashion such 
that each successive argument produced less change than the last, and a plateau occurred before the 
intentions reached the maximum possible score. Though participants with pro-meat attitudes 
dropped out more frequently than those with anti-meat attitudes, the intention to treat paradigm 
limits the possibility of drop-out effects masquerading as treatment effects (both in the case of 
attitude and intention change). Although it is conceivable that the intention to treat paradigm could 
cause a curvilinear relationship like the one shown here (as participants drop out their scores cease 
to change), re-running the analyses without the intention to treat data confirmed that the curvilinear 
relationship was genuine. When increasing attitude change no longer translates into increasing 
intention change, this suggests that a barrier known to participants is moderating the effect of 
attitude on intention change. The barrier could come under the social norm or PBC headings, but I 
was unable to discover what the barrier was in this case. It is possible that the paragraph about meat 
substitutes was not effective enough to tackle barriers related to lack of familiarity with low meat 
and vegetarian meals (as per Hoek et al., 2011; Lea & Worsley, 2008), or that the barrier was 
household members’ diets (Hoek et al., 2011; Larsson et al., 2003), or participants’ real or perceived 
dietary requirements, or some other factor not adequately measured in this experiment.
The curvilinear change in attitudes and intentions is mirrored by the hypothesized decrease in 
participants' belief in the arguments over time, which is indicative of defensiveness. With a properly 
counterbalanced order, there is no objective reason why the third argument should be less believable 
than the first, unless participants experienced cognitive dissonance or anxiety about their behaviour. 
This anxiety can be easily solved by denying the validity of the arguments; if they are less true, then 
there is less reason to feel anxious about the subject matter. Another example of defensive 
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behaviour is that participants who dropped out had more positive attitudes towards meat and 
experienced more ambivalence towards meat consumption. This suggests that the experiment 
caused anxiety in those participants, and they dropped out in order to escape it.
More evidence for defensive reactions is in the variables that predict belief in the argument. If 
participants were truly objective and rational in their analyses of the arguments, then baseline 
attitude should have had no effect on belief. Instead, in all instances, baseline attitude was the 
primary predictor of belief, with pro-meat attitudes predicting low belief. Age also predicted belief 
in the environmental and ethical arguments (older participants believed them less) however age did 
not predict belief in the health argument. The environmental, and especially the ethical argument, 
imply that people who eat meat harm other creatures indirectly through environmental degradation, 
or directly via animal suffering, respectively. The health argument, however, merely implies that 
people have been harming themselves. It is possible that participants who have been eating meat 
longer (the older participants) experienced more anxiety and cognitive dissonance as a result of the 
ethical and environmental arguments than young participants who have only made independent 
choices about their meat consumption for a few years, and therefore have caused less harm than the 
older participants. In partial support of this hypothesis, young participants believed in the ethical 
argument significantly more than older participants, and both groups believed approximately the 
same amount in the health argument. Though there was a difference in belief in the environmental 
argument (young participants believed it more), the difference was not significant. Thus there 
appears to be a defensive reaction to the ethical argument on the part of older participants.
 
By most definitions of defense mechanisms, any reaction to a stimulus that reduces anxiety (e.g. 
Funder, 2004; DuNann Winter & Koger, 2010), or improves self-esteem (Baumeister, Dale & 
Sommer, 1998) can be considered to be a defense mechanism. This definition of defense 
mechanisms is problematic when conducting research looking for defense mechanisms in 
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environmental activism research for two reasons. First, it means that both positive and negative 
reactions to a stimulus (e.g. denial or sublimation) can both be labelled as defense mechanisms. 
This leaves too many possible outcomes that would indicate defense mechanisms, which is hardly a 
good hypothesis test. This problem can be solved by specifying levels of defense mechanisms in the 
hypotheses: immature defenses (denial, devaluation, rationalization, etc.), or mature defenses 
(humour, sublimation, altruism, etc.). Given that denial is a commonly discussed defense 
mechanism in eco psychology, the second problem is in distinguishing between healthy scepticism 
and denial. For this, a definition from outside psychology is useful; Shermer (2010) suggests that 
sceptics examine the evidence carefully and follow where it leads, whereas deniers simply deny the 
validity of the argument indefinitely. Thus, assuming the arguments are valid, a curve or plateau in 
attitude change over time would indicate defensive reactions, but a linear progression would not.
The defensive reactions suggest that, with potentially anxiety-inducing arguments, less is more. 
There is little point in bombarding people with many arguments against eating meat. Instead, people 
should be allowed to contemplate and “come to grips” with the new information. When shown 
arguments against meat consumption the attitudes of participants will become more negative 
towards meat over the course of a week, even if they are not exposed to further arguments against 
meat consumption (Berndsen & Van der Pligt, 2005). Of the arguments we evaluated, it appears that 
the ethical argument produces the most attitude and intention change, followed by the 
environmental and health arguments, which were equally effective. The ethical argument was also 
the most believable, followed by the environmental, then health arguments, which at first seems 
counter-intuitive, because the ethical argument contained the fewest references. Meat consumption 
though, is influenced more by affective than cognitive arguments (Aikman, Crites & Fabrigar, 2006; 
Berndsen Van der Pligt, 2005), and the ethical argument was more emotive than the other two. It is 
possible that the relatively cold, intellectual tone of the environmental and health arguments made it 
easier for participants to use intellectualization as a defense mechanism, thus reducing the anxiety 
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caused by the arguments, and thereby reducing the need to sublimate the anxiety into attitude and 
intention change. The health argument was the least emotive, and therefore this interpretation 
explains why it produced the least attitude and intention change. The greater overall effectiveness of 
the ethical argument (assuming the effect was not due entirely to tone) also makes intuitive sense. It 
is difficult to argue that it is ok to cause animals great pain in order to eat large amounts of meat or 
make lots of money. The ethical argument was closely followed in effectiveness by the 
environmental one, then by the health argument. That the health argument finished last (though 
contrary to the hypothesis), upon reflection is not very surprising; people, especially women (the 
majority of our sample), are told on a regular basis that they need to eat red meat to be healthy. 
Friends, family members, and even some doctors insist a vegetarian diet is unhealthy despite current 
dietary guidelines (American Dietetic Association, 2003; Fraser, 2009) and continue to recommend 
that patients with low iron eat red meat, even though shellfish and many fortified cereals contain far 
more iron (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2005). It is impossible with the current paradigm to 
tease apart the effects of each argument from the effects of the tone. More research using all three 
arguments with both cold and hot tones will be necessary, though it is possible that the ethical 
argument, by its very nature, will always evoke more emotions. Therefore special interest groups 
wishing to promote reduced meat consumption would be wise to ensure that emotive ethical (and 
environmental) arguments appear first and foremost in their information.
 As participants saw more arguments in favour of reducing meat consumption, their attitudes 
towards meat and intentions to consume it changed favourably, however this change was buffered 
by the person's belief in the arguments. Whilst prior attitudes influenced beliefs, beliefs in turn 
mediated the relationship between age and post-argument attitude. Belief also moderated the effect 
of baseline attitudes on post-argument attitudes; when belief in the argument was low, baseline 
attitudes predicted post-argument attitudes, but when belief in the argument was high, baseline 
attitudes were no longer predictive of post-argument attitudes (see Baron & Kenny, 1986 for an 
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explanation of mediation vs. moderation). Though ambivalence was a significant predictor of 
intention change in response to the health argument, there was no evidence for a mediating or 
moderating role of ambivalence to replicate Berndsen and Van der Pligt's (2004) and Sparks et al.'s 
(2001) findings. Belief in the argument is conceptually related to ambivalence, in that ambivalence 
is a measure of the variance of attitudes to an object, and might also measure hesitancy to believe 
the arguments. Thus the variance normally explained by ambivalence may have been subsumed by 
beliefs in this study.
Though I expected that participants who were able to distinguish between the moral validity of an 
argument and their personal opinions (as indicated by a high MJT score) would be able to separate 
the influence of their attitudes from their belief in the arguments, this was not the case. MJT score 
was not able to predict participants' beliefs in the arguments, or moderate the effect of prior attitude 
on belief. There are several possible reasons for this. The first is that although the MJT measures 
moral reasoning, it measures a very rational aspect of it. Since meat consumption is a very affective 
topic (Aikman, Crites & Fabrigar, 2006; Berndsen & Van der Pligt, 2005), it could be that a test of 
moral abilities that accounts for affective morality (the “gut feeling” that something is right or 
wrong) would be more accurate in predicting attitude change (see Matsuba & Walker, 1998). A 
second, related possibility is that the ability to judge an argument's moral value does not mean that a 
person is likely to be swayed by the argument; the moral judgement occurs in a cold, intellectual 
manner, rather than a hot, emotive, and persuasive manner. A third (though I like to think unlikely) 
possibility is that my own moral judgement ability is rather poor and I was unable to see through 
my own personal bias to construct arguments with a high level of moral reasoning, thus they were 
not more persuasive to people with a high moral judgement ability. Though other researchers have 
previously linked poor moral judgment to use of immature defense mechanisms, we were unable to 
replicate their results (Hart & Chmiel, 1992; Matsuba & Walker, 1998).
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Psychologists should strive to communicate to activists that hostile or degrading reaction are part of 
a natural, adaptive (though not always optimal) response to anxiety- or dissonance-provoking 
messages. Activists can be upset and confused when they receive negative reactions, often from the 
very people they wish to help, and it might help alleviate their distress to know that the defensive 
reactions are not a result of hatred towards the activist, but instead the result of anxiety or cognitive 
dissonance within the self. Another important message to communicate to activists is that 
defensiveness increases with the number of arguments presented to a person, so those wishing to 
achieve change should encourage people gently, allowing them plenty of opportunity to reflect on 
the new information. It also appears that belief in the argument is a key determining factor in the 
effectiveness of an argument, so practitioners, policy makers, and activists alike should ensure they 
are familiar with the research on trust (see Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). It is possible, 
however, to engage people and influence them to change their intentions to consume meat through 
carefully prepared information alone. When people are told how to include meat alternatives in their 
meals, it seems that the environmental and animal-rights arguments with an emotive tone are the 
most effective way to influence people. 
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Appendix B: Predictors of post argument attitudes.
Table A 1 
Predictors of post ethic argument attitudes
Step Predictor variable B SE B β Model R2 R2 change
1
Baseline attitude***  .97 .04  .90
Gender** -.21 .06 -.09
Age*  .01 .00  .07
Social Norm -.02 .01 -.06
Meat consumption -.04 .02 -.06
PBC  .07 .05  .04
MJT score  .00 .00  .01
Education -.00 .02 -.00 .80*** .80***
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Beliefs in environmental argument*** -.20 .03 -.15 .82*** .02***
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Ambivalence -.03 .03 -.03 .82*** .00
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Ambivalence x baseline attitude -.02 .03 -.02
Gender x baseline attitude -.08 .06 -.13
MJT score x baseline attitude  .00 .00 -.02
Belief in argument x baseline attitude** -.09 .03 -.08 .83*** .01**
Notes: enter method used
All variables are carried over from the previous to the next step, but for the sake of brevity are not 
reproduced a second time. Any significant changes in variables from one step to the next are 
reported in the text.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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Table A 2 
Predictors of post health argument attitudes
Step Predictor variable B SE B β Model R2 R2 change
1 Baseline attitude***  .99 .04  .94
Age**  .01 .00  .08
Gender* -.15 .06 -.07
Social Norm -.02 .01 -.05
Meat consumption -.04 .02 -.07
PBC  .03 .05  .02
MJT score  .00 .00  .04
Education -.00 .02 -.01 .83*** .83***
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Beliefs in environmental argument*** -.20 .03 -.15 .85*** .02***
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Ambivalence -.04 .03 -.04 .85*** .00
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Ambivalence x baseline attitude -.04 .03 -.04
Gender x baseline attitude -.02 .05 -.03
MJT score x baseline attitude  .00 .00  .01
Belief in argument x baseline attitude* -.06 .03 -.05 .85*** .00
Notes: enter method used
All variables are carried over from the previous to the next step, but for the sake of brevity are not 
reproduced a second time. Any significant changes in variables from one step to the next are 
reported in the text.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
